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In this survey I succinctly review the contract theory literature on the re- 
bellious manager type of agency conflict. Freedom of enterprise, private property, 
and the incentives of businessmen to make profits are essential values of the capi-
talist economic system. When economic institutions that preserve these values are 
in place, capital circulates, businesses invest and the economy grows. Just as prices 
do not need to be intervened for markets to work, capital too can work when left 
alone: savings are transformed into investments, prospects of future cash flows 
are taken at present value, and small-investor distrust is overcome even in the face 
of unfamiliar risky enterprises. 
That none of these features of capitalism requires central planning is not due 
to some invisible-hand miracle, but instead is the result of social arrangements en-
gineered to inspire trust. The corporation was one of these legal artifacts. When 
firms started incorporating in the 18th century, a revolution was sparked: for 
the first time, outside investors could pool their savings and passively wait for a 
return. Their investments relied not just on pure faith but on the rule of law and 
its enforcement. 
The main reason why corporations work is that stock buyers benefit from 
large-scale returns, while being kept protected by limited liability. Thanks to 
this financial invention, hundreds of thousands of investors can buy low stakes 
of firms in many capital markets around the world, injecting capital into the 
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world economy. Putting aside the environmental-degradation dangers related to 
mischievous corporations, the economic literature overwhelmingly regards the 
corporation as vital for the development of capital markets. 
The existence of a separate corporation persona has been advantageous for 
investors wishing to protect themselves from unwelcome liabilities. But this same 
legal independence feature has made it hard to understand who should be held 
accountable for the corporation’s decisions and why it behaves the way it does. 
These two questions underlie this survey. 
On the issue of who is to be held accountable for corporations, the answer is 
safely attributed to wealthy entrenched elites, since they are by far the most preva-
lent type of owners (Morck, et al., 2005). This is evidenced in the vast majority of 
countries worldwide:1 in Continental Europe the percentage of publicly traded 
firms with controlling shareholders is very high [65% as reported in Franc 
 (Faccio and Lang, 2002)], or 19% of market capitalization being controlled by 10 
families in Belgium (Morck, et al., 2005, p. 667), as well as in Asia [in Indonesia 
70% of publicly traded firms have controlling shareholders (Claessens, et al., 
2002, p. 2750)], and Latin America [in Colombia the mean of equity in hands of 
the largest four shareholders is 65% (Gutiérrez, et al., 2008, p. 27)]. 
This high prevalence of controlling shareholders does not fit well into the 
modern-finance textbook view of corporations in which “corporate insiders need 
not act in the best interests of the providers of the funds” (Tirole, 2006, p. 15). 
The evidence of a world where concentrated control grows in the wild (and re-
mains uncontested over time) leaves little space for wayward-managers. 
Since controlling shareholders loom in the background of finance theory, 
most types of regulatory mechanisms addressing agency issues are framed with 
a loose manager in mind. As a consequence of this biased focus, the literature 
has abundant calls for “discipline”, “alignment of incentives”, “monitoring”, 
and “market-of-corporate-control corrections”. Legislation following these re-
commendations will be awkwardly implemented within control-based economies 
(countries where controlling shareholders are the norm).
1 Exceptions to this pattern are the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, where large firms 
are widely dispersed.
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I. CONTRACT THEORY IN FINANCE 
The application of the theory of contracts to finance stresses that corpora-
tions host internal conflicts manifested in managers with huge bargaining power. 
Whereas in traditional contract theory the conflict lies in a boss having a worker 
who exerts little effort, in finance the informational asymmetries translate to 
shareholders and manager (here the agent is not a worker but instead the ceo). 
Managers that go unmonitored may “misbehave”, which could mean either that 
they openly divert funds from the firm or that maybe the just avoid making 
tough decisions (i.e. payroll cuts, imposing high-standards, saying no to high-risk 
business opportunities). 
The crux of this agency conflict lies in the principal’s disinformation about 
the agent’s performance. Notice that the breach of ethics happens independently 
of the morality of the agent: he is a utility-maximizer that ends up (inadvertently) 
misbehaving. For sure, the agent is opportunistic from the standpoint of the 
principal, but he falls in this situation without any inner motives to wrong others. 
Consequently, to fix the problem involves reducing the disinformation of the 
principal, instead of increasing the honesty of the agent. 
The insight that it was the design of the contract what turned otherwise honest 
people into dishonest behavior, and not the other way around, would probably 
had led to the coining of “moral hazard”. Certainly, the first to informally identify 
this were insurance agents at the turn of the 20th century.2 Insurance companies 
are accustomed to prepare for the worst and,  as long as they can assign a probabi-
lity to a hazard, they think they can manage it. Perhaps the icy treatment of moral 
hazard in contract theory can be traced to its roots in the insurance industry.
In 1932, Berle and Means published their classic book on the problem of mis-
behaved managers in modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932). Their work, 
which bonded moral hazard with management, was way ahead of their time. The 
finance literature did not catch up with it until many decades later.3 Since Berle 
and Means circumscribed their argument to the United States’ case of widely 
dispersed shareholders, the agency conflict of unmonitored managers is often 
dubbed “the Berle and Means corporation” (La-Porta, et al., 1999). 
2  Not until 1963 was the idea imported into economics by Arrow (1963).
3 That moral hazard deserved much attention and that it was not just some curiosity was first proposed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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What exactly is proposed by the agency conflict of opportunistic managers? 
First, shareholders are concerned that their firm generates profits at the end of 
the year and that the decision of what to do with them will be taken by someone 
else. Second, managers appointed by shareholders can only be held partially 
responsible for bad results, since they act in risky environments. Finally, there is a 
separation of ownership and control in which shareholders have the ownership, 
managers have the control, and the two need not be congruent. 
Even if shareholders wanted to gather more information on the daily 
decisions taken by management, their stakes in the firm are so small as to end up 
aban doning any monitoring initiative. Each shareholder then becomes a “free 
rider” who hopes that someone else does the job of keeping an eye on the 
manager. 
The formal characterization of the principal-agent model was honed in a series 
of papers by Holmstrom, Grossman and Hart in the late 1970’s. They give credit 
to Mirrlees (1971) for coming up with the “single-crossing property condition” 
that made the theory tractable. Hart (1983, p. 4) sums up the broad-sourced 
origins of contract theory: 
[...] the tools used to analyze optimal labor contracts under asymmetric informa-
tion are very similar to those found in a number of other areas of “information 
economics”. In particular, there is a considerable overlap with the theories of 
optimal income taxation; non-linear pricing; signaling and screening; incentive 
compatibility; the principal-agent problem; price versus quantity instruments in 
planning problems; and optimal auctions. We will not spell out the connections, 
but we feel that it is appropriate to mention the paper to which our analysis owes 
the most: Mirrlees (1971).” 
The standard solution to the moral hazard problem of managers was that 
a part of the shares of the firm had to be given to its executives. A practical 
consequence of this solution was that the issue of stock options sky-rocketed in 
the United States. Also, empirical finance papers began examining the effects of 
“inside ownership”, or “managerial ownership”.  A widely reached conclusion 
suggested either a positive relation with monitoring and firm value, or a non- 
monotonic, curvilinear association.
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II. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS ENTER THE PICTURE 
Modern finance studies started to shift toward an interest in controlling share-
holders in the late 1980’s. Early attempts to account for controlling shareholders 
in the finance literature included them as one of many mechanisms to “discipline 
management”. For instance, Hart (1995) defined five mechanisms for doing so, 
including boards of directors, proxy fights, large shareholders, hostile takeovers, 
and capital structure. Controlling shareholders reach here a place as important as 
an exogenous variable with the auxiliary function of “curbing mismanagement”. 
It was, indeed, necessary to separate the agency conflicts of rebel managers 
from those of controlling shareholders. To portray them as two opposite sides 
of a coin was a lost cause: According to Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010), “with 
a controlling shareholder, the fundamental governance problem is not oppor-
tunism by executives and directors at the expense of public shareholders at 
large but opportunism by the controlling shareholder at the expense of the 
minority shareholders”. An excellent synthesis of this new classification of agency 
problems can be found in Villalonga, et al. (2015). 
A promising new line of research is how controlling shareholders can have 
an advantage when dealing with corporate strategies as diverse as exports, r&d, 
global chain management, or commodity-extraction. We believe this demands a 
new approach to the agency conflict that is traditionally used in modern finance 
to accommodate for the costs and benefits of controlling shareholders.
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